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Abstract 
In his critique of the extended mind hypothesis, Robert Rupert 
suggests that we have no reason to move from the claim that 
cognition is deeply embedded in the environment to the more 
radical claim that, in some cases, cognition itself extends into 
the environment. In this paper, I argue that we have strong 
normative reasons to prefer the more radical extended mind 
hypothesis to Rupert’s modest embedded mind hypothesis. I 
take an agnostic position on the metaphysical debate about the 
ultimate nature and location of the mind, and instead argue in 
favor of the extended mind framework on the basis of its ability 
to better capture normative concerns about the way we evaluate 
the cognitive capacities of learning disabled individuals. In light 
of the commitments of the embedded and extended mind 
frameworks, defenders of the embedded mind framework are 
committed to conclusions about learning-disabled individuals 
that we have good normative reason to reject, whereas the 
extended mind framework avoids such problematic 
conclusions. Thus, if we find these normative concerns 
persuasive, we have good reason to prefer the extended mind 
position.  
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1. CLARK AND CHALMERS’ EXTENDED MIND 
 
he extended mind hypothesis, first defended by Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers, suggests that the mind is 
not contained exclusively within the brain, but rather extends 
into the external world. Proponents of extended cognition 
(also known as transcranial cognition) suggest that cognitive 
processes rely so heavily on the recruitment of resources in 
the body and the external environment that those resources 
ought to be considered part of cognitioni. Furthermore, they 
argue, the traditional “intracranial” conception of the mind, 
according to which cognition takes place wholly within the 
brain, rests on unfounded assumptions about what 
constitutes cognition, and we ought to reject such 
assumptions in favor of a framework that does not 
discriminate among neural, bodily, and environmental 
resources. Rather, we should think of the mind as being 
distributed over all of these resources. Crucially, defenders 
of extended cognition do not claim that everything has 
cognitive status, but when environmental and bodily 
resources are paired with with neural resources in the right 
sort of way, cognition extends into those resources. 
 
In their seminal paper “The Extended Mind” (1998), Clark 
and Chalmers suggest that there is no principled reason to 
draw the boundaries of cognition at the brain. Their 
argument in favor of extended cognition relies heavily on an 
idea that has come to be known as the parity principle, which 
they state as follows:  
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the 
world functions as a process which, were it 
done in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in recognizing as part of the 
cognitive process, then that part of the world 
T 
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is … part of the cognitive process. (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998, p. 29)  
 
They defend this claim in the context of a thought 
experiment in which an Alzheimer’s patient named Otto 
carries around a notebook everywhere he goes, jotting down 
notes and recruiting information about names, dates, 
locations, etc. as needed. Clark and Chalmers argue that the 
information in Otto’s notebook functions in the same way 
that neural memory functions in most people, and so there is 
no principled reason to differentiate between the cognitive 
status of neural memory and that of the information in Otto’s 
notebook. Their parity principle is meant to point to a kind 
of cognitive chauvinism in the way that we think about 
where the mind exists and what it’s made of, suggesting that 
our practice of limiting attributions of cognitive status to just 
those processes that take place exclusively in the brain ought 
to be abandoned.  
  
2.   EXTENDED OR EMBEDDED? 
 
This thesis that the mind at least sometimes extends beyond 
the boundaries of skin and skull has had many outspoken 
critics. The most salient challenge for my project comes 
from Robert Rupert, who argues that that there is no clear 
reason why we should make the move from what he calls the 
Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition (HEMC) to the 
Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) (Rupert 2004). 
HEMC holds that 
 
...cognitive processes depend very heavily, in 
hitherto unexpected ways, on organismically 
external props and devices and on the 
structure of the external environment in 
which cognition takes place. (Rupert 2004, 
393) 
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HEC, on the other hand, maintains that these environmental 
features are so integral to cognitive processes that they 
should be considered part of these cognitive processes. 
Rupert explains: 
 
HEMC is significantly less radical than HEC. 
According to HEMC, we can properly 
understand the traditional subject’s cognitive 
processes only by taking into account how 
the agent exploits the surrounding 
environment to carry out her cognitive work. 
In contrast, HEC implies that, for many 
purposes, we should set aside our focus on 
the traditional subject: the unit of analysis 
should be the organism and certain aspects of 
its environment treated together, as a single, 
unified system. (Rupert 2004, p. 8) 
 
Rupert resists the move from HEC to HEMC, arguing that 
while the environment plays an important explanatory role 
in cognition, it does not, itself, instantiate cognition. Though 
HEMC is sympathetic to the claim that the environment 
plays a crucial role in cognitive processes, and thus the 
organism cannot simply be studied in a vacuum if we hope 
to gain a true understanding of the mind, it is ultimately an 
intracranial position. That is, Rupert’s claim that one could 
recognize the indispensability of studying an agent’s 
environment for understanding her cognition without 
conceding that the environment is actually a part of her 
cognition reveals deep intracranial commitments about what 
really constitutes the mind, despite the similarities between 
the two frameworks. Rupert argues that we can explain all 
of the relevant phenomena that cognitive scientists are 
interested in by using HEMC alone, and thus the move to 
HEC is both unwarranted and unnecessary. He argues that 
“If HEC does not [offer superior explanations for these 
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phenomena], then all other things being equal, we should 
endorse HEMC over HEC, by dint of the methodological 
principle of conservatism.” (p. 9)  
 
Clark and others who defend the extended mind thesis have 
responded to such challenges by pointing out that this begs 
the question against HEC by using intracranial processes as 
the standard against which other processes’ cognitive status 
is measured, committing the fallacy of privileging 
intracranial processes that their parity principle was 
originally created to combat. Clark may be correct that this 
challenge begs the question against extended cognition, and 
thus cannot serve as the basis of an outright rejection of the 
extended thesis. However, we are left with something of an 
open choice between embedded and extended cognition, and 
it is difficult to determine how we ought to adjudicate 
between the two. Rupert’s challenge is a strong one, and the 
task of showing why one ought to prefer the extended thesis 
to the embedded thesis proves quite difficult. At its heart is 
a deep metaphysical debate about what ought to count as part 
of the mind. Though the hypothesis of embedded cognition 
is sympathetic to the spirit of extended cognition, which 
emphasizes the importance of the body and environment in 
understanding mental processes, its underlying 
commitments are still in line with intracranialist conceptions 
of the mind, as the embedded hypothesis still maintains that 
the mind itself is only realized by neural underpinnings.  
 
The central question that Rupert’s challenge addresses, and 
one that is most often debated in this field is this: what kind 
of stuff is the mind made of, and where does that stuff reside? 
However, in contrast to many who are engaged in the 
dialogue surrounding extended cognition, I do not wish to 
take up a metaphysical debate about where, precisely, the 
mind resides or what it is made of. Since the sciences of the 
mind are still largely in their infancies, and the field of 
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cognitive science is especially new and immature, it is 
unlikely that we currently have the resources to arrive at a 
definitive ontology of mind and cognition. Furthermore, 
since cognitive science does not have a clearly defined 
procedure for determining the boundaries of its own domain 
of inquiry, I have no commitments about what counts as a 
cognitive process and where such a process must occur. 
Rather, I shall take my cue from Ross and Ladyman (2010), 
who argue that minds are not, as a matter of fact, located 
anywhere at all. They suggest that our commonsense 
intuition that minds are located “in the head” results from 
faulty folk metaphysical notions of containment, according 
to which the matter that makes up the universe is organized 
into entities that “contain” smaller and more fundamental 
entities, which themselves contain smaller and more 
fundamental bits of matter, etc. Ross and Ladyman argue 
that the physical sciences give us good reason to reject this 
metaphysical picture as a description of the ultimate nature 
of the universe, and, since the metaphysics of mind is in the 
business of describing the ultimate nature of the world of 
mentation and cognition, we ought not import this faulty 
metaphysical machinery into our philosophy of mind. 
Rather, they argue, the idea of the mind being located here 
or there should be thought of as a useful metaphor, but one 
that will ultimately be replaced by a more precise and mature 
cognitive science. Thus, they suggest, the rigorous 
metaphysical debate about where the mind is located that has 
occupied this field for so long is misguided. As they explain, 
“To talk about the location of the mind is simply to resort to 
metaphor. We don’t object to using metaphors, but we do 
object to arguing over whose metaphors are literally true.” 
(Ross and Ladyman 2010) I will follow suit, taking on board 
this assumption that characterizations of the location of the 
mind are, at best, metaphorical. Ross and Ladyman (and I) 
find it plausible that such a mature description of the 
processes that underpin cognition will recruit a variety of 
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resources that will span brain, body, and environment. 
However, at our current level of sophistication in this young 
science, we simply do not have the resources to offer such a 
description. Therefore, in adjudicating between the extended 
and embedded mind hypotheses, we ought to turn our 
attention to different kinds of questions.  
 
In this project, I will take up a different sort of argument in 
favor of the extended mind hypothesis, situating my 
examination of the debate between embedded and extended 
cognition in the context of research in learning disability 
studies. I will explore some normative concerns in the 
disability literature about how we ought to conceptualize and 
respond to cognitive diversity and cognitive capability, 
arguing that the extended cognition framework better 
captures these normative commitments than the embedded 
framework. Because the academic and clinical study of the 
mind has historically marginalized individuals with atypical 
cognitive abilities, and this marginalization has had harmful 
effects on the experiences of LD individuals, the way that 
we conceptualize cognitive diversity has significant ethical 
consequences. It shapes our clinical research, our 
educational practices, our social attitudes, and the 
opportunities that are afforded to citizens based on our 
perceptions of their capabilities. If our theory of cognition 
naturally leads us to conclusions about LD individuals’ 
cognitive capacities or functioning that we have reason to be 
skeptical of, then that gives us good reason to revise our 
theory of cognition. Therefore, if the extended cognition 
framework offers a way of conceptualizing cognitive 
diversity that is less marginalizing of LD individuals than an 
intracranial framework, we have serious ethical reasons to 
consider adopting it.  
 
Furthermore, though I will discuss normative claims that are 
embraced by many in LD research, I will remain agnostic 
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about whether or not these claims should, in fact, be 
embraced. I suspect that they do have merit, but my project 
is not to defend the truth or desirability of these normative 
claims; I will simply explore whether the extended or 
embedded cognition framework best captures them. Then, I 
will argue that if they are claims that we find persuasive, and 
if the extended mind best captures them, then we have good 
normative reason to adopt the extended mind framework. 
Finally, though it is possible that the phenomena I describe 
could also be accommodated by a purely intracranial 
framework, this should not lead us to reject the extended 
mind framework. A common argument by skeptics of the 
extended cognition paradigm is that if both an intracranial 
and transcranial framework can capture a given set of data, 
we ought to opt for the more intuitively metaphysically 
conservative intracranial picture. However, since, following 
Ross and Ladyman, I submit that we have reason to be 
skeptical of the accuracy of our metaphysical intuitions and 
of their bearing on this discussion, this particular argument 
is not relevant here. Thus, in this exploration of the 
normative merits of intracranial vs. transcranial cognitive 
frameworks, these metaphysical intuitions ought not play a 
role in determining whether the extended cognition picture 
should be adopted.  
 
3.   PROTECTING THE MIND 
 
My project of giving normative reasons to prefer the 
extended cognition framework is not the first of its kind. One 
way of attempting to advocate for the extended mind 
position through appeal to normative considerations is by 
arguing that it suggests better protection against harm to the 
mind than the embedded framework does. Some (Levy 
2007; Clark and Drayson forthcoming) have argued in favor 
of the extended cognition thesis with respect to ethical 
questions that arise from the field of neuroethics about 
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protection of and alterations to the mind. It does seem that, 
in light of the fact that we do not, in fact, consider 
environmental scaffolding to be part of the mind, we are less 
likely to protect the environmental tools from harm in the 
same way that we protect the biological agent from harm. 
Indeed, it has been argued that insufficient attention has been 
paid to the importance of environmental scaffolding for the 
cognitive functioning of Alzheimer's patients, and this 
neglect can lead to traumatic consequences when they are 
carelessly removed from their environments and placed in 
new ones (such as assisted living centers) (Drayson and 
Clark forthcoming). Thus, under the extended mind thesis, 
the minds of disabled people who rely heavily on 
environmental tools are more vulnerable to harm than those 
who do not rely as heavily on them precisely because we 
have failed to recognize those tools as part of the mind. 
Therefore, our resistance to considering and thus protecting 
environmental tools as part of the agent’s mind leads us to 
neglect what ought to be protected as part of the mind of a 
disabled individual, thus placing them in greater danger of 
cognitive harm.  
 
If the mind is simply embedded, and the bio-external 
scaffolding does not constitute part of the mind, then the 
sorts of protections that we afford brains vs. those we afford 
environmental tools might differ significantly. On the other 
hand, if both are seen as part of the mind, then external 
scaffolding ought to be protected from harm or damage in 
the same way that we protect brains from harm and damage. 
Neil Levy (2007) captures this idea by offering a 
complementary principle to Clark and Chalmers’ parity 
principle, which he dubs the Ethical Parity Principle (EPP). 
According to the strongest version of the EPP, alterations to 
the bio-external parts of a cognitive system are ethically 
equivalent to alterations to the brain. A weaker version of the 
EPP claims that alterations to the bio-external environment 
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are ethically on a par with alterations to the brain insofar as 
the reasons we have for objecting to the latter are 
transferrable to cases of the former.  
 
Zoe Drayson and Andy Clark (forthcoming), echoing Levy, 
note that one could accept the weak version of the EPP while 
still maintaining that the mind is merely embedded and not 
extended. That is, the weak EPP only maintains that the 
reasons for which we object to alterations of internal 
resources must be transferrable to external resources, not the 
way we actually conceptualize the cognitive status of those 
resources. Thus, with respect to the protections we afford 
external scaffolding, we need not accept that such 
scaffolding is part of the mind in order to recognize the need 
to protect such external tools when protecting an individual 
from mental harm. Therefore, arguments from the protection 
of bio-external scaffolding do not offer sufficient reason to 
prefer the extended mind framework over the embedded 
mind framework. The proponent of the embedded 
framework may be able to maintain, based on the weaker 
version of the EPP, the claim that we ought to afford special 
protection to the bio-external tools that cognitively 
vulnerable individuals utilize. Thus, Levy suggests that there 
is no practical difference between the embedded and 
extended mind frameworks with respect to the employment 
of the EPP, since all that matters is that we recognize the 
importance of the role of the external environment in 
thought.  
 
Levy’s account of the EPP focuses on alterations to and 
protection of the mind, suggesting that internal and external 
resources are ethically on a par with one another with respect 
to these alterations and protections. However, as Levy 
explains, it seems that the embedded mind defender can still 
account for this kind of parity without conceding that 
external resources partly constitute the mind. Therefore, this 
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sort of appeal to the protection of the mind from alterations 
does not, itself, establish sufficient normative reasons for 
preferring the extended mind framework.  
 
Though the EPP might not give us reason to prefer the 
extended mind framework with respect to the protections we 
afford to external resources, there are other sorts of 
normative reasons for preferring the extended over the 
embedded hypothesis. In what follows, I will offer a 
different normative argument in favor of the extended mind 
framework by illustrating problematic commitments about 
the cognitive capabilities of LD individuals, arguing that the 
extended mind position avoids these conclusions. The 
extended mind framework holds that both bio-internal and 
bio-external resources can instantiate cognition. If this is 
true, then we ought not attribute normative priority to either 
internal or external resources when evaluating the cognitive 
capabilities of an extended cognitive system. This normative 
neutrality is more difficult for the embedded mind defender 
to maintain; according to the embedded framework, bio-
external resources are not eligible to count as capable of 
performing cognitive activity, so evaluations of the 
cognitive capabilities of an individual must attribute special 
status to neural resources that cannot be attributed to non-
neural resources. The extended mind framework, on the 
other hand, is committed to no such position. If both bio-
internal and bio-external resources can instantiate cognition, 
then no normative priority need be assigned to either one in 
evaluations of cognitive capability. As I will argue, we have 
good reason to evaluate the capabilities of LD individuals 
paired with the assistive technologies they use with the sort 
of neutrality that only the extended mind position can 
maintain, and thus my account offers strong normative 
reasons to prefer the extended mind framework. 
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4.   THE CASE OF DANA 
 
Since I am situating this project in the context of LD 
individuals and the assistive technologies they use to 
facilitate cognitive processes, let us consider a paradigm 
case of the use of such environmental tools for LD 
individuals: graphic organizers. Graphic organizers are 
visuospatial representations of ideas or information designed 
to make the relationships among the concepts more salient 
(a facet of learning that is often difficult for people with LD). 
There are many different kinds of graphic organizers 
(cognitive maps, venn diagrams, flowcharts, etc.), and 
different types are helpful for different LD individuals. For 
many LD individuals, graphic organizers aid in 
understanding and evaluating the relationships among 
concepts that might otherwise be puzzling to them, and these 
sorts of visuospatial representations of information have 
been shown to be helpful cognitive tools for learning, 
problem solving, and planning (Sturm and Rankin-Erickson, 
2002; Dexter et al., 2011).  
 
Consider someone with a learning disability, Dana, who 
requires a graphic organizer of potential decisions in order 
to evaluate which decision is best. In this example, let us 
imagine that Dana has a very difficult time comparing the 
relevant factors when she must evaluate them solely “in her 
head,” but when allowed to create and utilize a visual 
diagram of the various possibilities, her decision making 
skills are just as good as anyone’s. In this case, she needs a 
particular physical configuration of information in order to 
be able to perform a cognitive process like comparing and 
choosing among potential courses of action, and without the 
aid of these external resources, it would appear that she is 
incapable of performing this cognitive action. But we 
certainly would not want to conclude that she cannot make 
complex decisions; she is quite capable of doing so, but she 
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requires a different sort of environmental scaffolding than 
others do. She is only unable to complete the task when she 
is denied the ability to use particular tools (in other words, 
when her learning environment makes particular demands 
that are incompatible with her biology). According to certain 
conceptions of disability, most notably the social model of 
disability (Barnes 2009), Dana’s learning disability is a 
function of a mismatch between her biological makeup and 
the setup of her learning environment. That disability is 
contingent on the particular environment, since in a different 
environmental context (namely, one in which she has access 
to graphic organization tools), she no longer faces the same 
difficulties or limitations. Thus, properly understanding 
Dana’s cognitive capacities, and therefore her learning 
disability, depends on properly understanding her 
environmentally situated cognitive processes.  
 
Furthermore, the kinds of cognitive capabilities that I am 
discussing in this project are mental states, skills, and 
processes that we would intuitively attribute to the person 
herself (i.e. language production, decision making, beliefs 
and memories, mathematical computation, critical thinking, 
etc.). Thus, insofar as our evaluation of what Dana’s mind is 
capable of depends on understanding her environment, our 
understanding of her capabilities as a person likewise depend 
on this. It is possible that the distinction between Dana’s 
capabilities and her mind’s capabilities would become more 
important when considering cases of environmental 
scaffolding and its relationship to unconscious processes, or 
processes that we do not clearly identify with higher-order 
thought. In such cases, we may not as readily attribute such 
processes to the person herself. However, since the cognitive 
processes I discuss are features of higher-order cognition 
that operate at the level of personhood, in the context of this 
project, Dana’s mind’s capabilities are also Dana’s 
capabilities. 
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5.   REPAIRING THE MIND 
 
Though an understanding of Dana’s cognitive capacities 
depends on an understanding of her environmental 
surroundings, this does not yet provide reason to prefer the 
extended mind over the embedded mind; both positions 
maintain the importance of understanding the environment. 
Levy suggests that, at least with respect to our attitudes 
toward alterations to the mind, it doesn’t ultimately matter 
whether we adopt the embedded or extended frameworks, as 
long as we recognize the importance of external scaffolding 
in thought. Drayson and Clark, however, argue that the 
embedded and extended mind frameworks have importantly 
different ethical implications. These ethical implications 
become clearer upon a closer analysis of what the embedded 
mind framework is committed to saying about the cognitive 
capabilities of neuroatypical individuals. In order to make 
this case, Drayson and Clark consider two different 
approaches to cognitive rehabilitation, the process of 
improving an individual’s impaired ability to process 
information and thereby improve everyday functioning. 
There are two main strategies of cognitive rehabilitation, 
restorative and compensatory, where the former focuses on 
restoring damaged neural systems and the latter focuses on 
adaptive strategies that recruit both internal and external 
resources to improve cognitive functioning. Some view 
compensatory rehabilitation as a kind of second-best option, 
a strategy that we must resort to in light of our limited 
understanding of neuroscience, but one that will ultimately 
be discarded in favor of neural restoration once our 
technology and understanding is sufficiently advanced. Until 
then, many suggest, compensatory strategies are an effective 
way of enhancing functional capacities, but are simply a 
“useful substitute” for neural repair, which is seen as the 
only true way to restore the mind. Drayson and Clark argue 
that the extended mind thesis allows us to view 
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compensatory strategies as an equally legitimate way of 
restoring or improving the mental capacities of neurally 
damaged individuals, offering more than a simple second-
best option to neural regeneration. They suggest, in fact, that 
the extended mind thesis offers a different way of 
conceptualizing the distinction between rehabilitation and 
compensation. Rather than limiting cases of true 
rehabilitation only to those in which neural circuits are 
restored, we ought to evaluate rehabilitation based on the 
functional capacities of extended cognitive systems.  
 
The embedded mind thesis, on the other hand, must maintain 
the traditional distinction between restorative and 
compensatory rehabilitation. If cognition is located 
exclusively in neurons, then the only way in which a 
damaged mind could truly be rehabilitated is if the neural 
circuits are restored. But it seems particularly odd to remain 
committed to the identity between neural and mental activity 
with respect to these rehabilitative approaches when one 
considers technologies that are likely to be used in the future 
of cognitive rehabilitation. Andy Clark, in response to Jerry 
Fodor’s critique of the extended mind thesis, examines a 
case of the restoration of a damaged neural circuit with 
silicon “neurons” in order to illustrate the problem with this 
commitment:  
 
Let’s start small. There is a documented case 
(from the University of California’s Institute 
for Nonlinear Science) of a California spiny 
lobster, one of whose neurons was 
deliberately damaged and replaced by a 
silicon circuit that restored the original 
functionality: in this case, the control of 
rhythmic chewing...But now imagine a case 
in which a person (call her Diva) suffers 
minor brain damage and loses the ability to 
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perform a simple task of arithmetic division 
using only her neural resources. An external 
silicon circuit is added that restores the 
previous functionality. Diva can now divide 
just as before, only some small part of the 
work is distributed across the brain and the 
silicon circuit: a genuinely mental process 
(division) is supported by a hybrid bio-
technological system...If you imagine a case, 
identical to Diva’s, but in which the restored 
(or even some novel) functionality is 
provided – as it easily could be – by a 
portable device communicating with the 
brain by wireless, it becomes apparent that 
actual wiring is not important. If you next 
gently alter the details so that the device 
communicates with Diva’s brain through 
Diva’s sense organs (piggybacking on 
existing sensory mechanisms as cheap way 
stations to the brain) you end up with what 
David Chalmers and I dubbed ‘extended 
minds’. (Clark, 2009) 
 
If cognition can truly only occur in neurons, then even 
rehabilitative approaches that directly address the structural 
integrity of neural circuits, but rely on silicon structures 
rather than biological ones, could not count as true 
restoration. Thus, the kind of “hybrid bio-technological 
system” that Clark describes could not truly be a case of 
cognitive restoration, even though it is precisely the neural 
circuits that are being reconstructed.  
 
The extended mind framework, however, can much better 
accommodate this kind of rehabilitative strategy, and it 
would have no problem considering such a strategy to be a 
restoration of the mind. Furthermore, since the extended 
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thesis allows for a heterogeneous array of possible physical 
underpinnings of cognitive processes, the strategies for 
rehabilitating cognitive capabilities need not directly address 
neural circuits at all. Thus, the extended thesis allows for 
much broader possibilities regarding what counts as the 
restoration of cognitive abilities than does the embedded 
hypothesis. This becomes particularly important with 
respect to the use of assistive technologies in LD individuals. 
There is a similar distinction in LD research between 
“remedial” strategies and compensatory strategies to 
addressing learning difficulties (Garner and Campbell, 
1987), the former of which attempt to directly address the 
individual’s impairment and improve their ability to perform 
a particular task in the same way a non-disabled individual 
would, whereas the latter attempts to “circumvent” the 
impairment and help the individual perform a task using 
assistive technology. If we are to understand remedial 
strategies for LD as being analogous to restorative strategies 
in cognitive rehabilitation, the embedded mind thesis 
suggests that remedial strategies are the only way to truly 
enhance an LD individual’s cognitive capabilities. The 
compensatory approach, on the other hand, is simply a way 
of helping the individual get around her impairment and 
complete the task. However, the extended mind thesis allows 
us to say that even compensatory strategies for addressing 
learning disabilities are genuine ways of improving or 
increasing an LD individual’s cognitive capabilities, not 
simply circumventing an impairment. If the bio-external 
scaffolding that LD individuals who use compensatory 
assistive technologies use can, in some cases, be considered 
to be part of their cognitive systems, then an individual using 
such technologies has, in a robust sense, improved cognitive 
capabilities.  
 
One might object that this is an unfair characterization of the 
commitments of the embedded mind thesis, and that, 
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contrary to what I have suggested, it can actually allow that 
compensatory strategies are genuine strategies for repairing 
or improving the mind. The defender of the embedded mind 
thesis could argue that an agent’s environment plays an 
indispensable role in that evaluation of his cognitive 
abilities, in the same way that a mechanic’s tools play an 
indispensable role in our evaluation of her ability to fix a car. 
Therefore, insofar as those environmental tools play such a 
significant role in our cognitive capabilities, rehabilitative or 
compensatory strategies that target those environmental 
tools likewise ought to play a significant role in 
rehabilitating cognitive damage or addressing learning 
difficulties. The fact that the embedded mind thesis resists 
the conclusion that bio-external tools are part of cognition 
does not entail a resistance to rehabilitative strategies that 
target those tools.  
 
But if we maintain the embedded mind thesis, what are we 
to make of the neural differences between a disabled vs. non-
disabled person? If we maintain that only neurons really 
constitute the mind, there must be something like an inverse 
relationship between the extent to which an individual relies 
on external scaffolding and the extent to which we ought to 
say that her mind is really doing x, where x is some cognitive 
process. That is, something like the following principle is 
implied by intracranialism: neural activity thoroughly 
determines mental activity. Therefore, diminished neural 
activity means diminished mental activity. If that’s correct, 
then it’s difficult to see how one could resist the conclusion 
that neural impairment necessarily entails cognitive 
incapacity. It’s not clear how one could deny that diminished 
neural capacity amounts to diminished mental capacity, and 
thus neural impairment entails a cognitive deficit, regardless 
of what sort of external scaffolding is available. In the case 
of Dana, it seems that the intracranialist has to say something 
like the following: because Dana’s cognitive makeup relies 
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more heavily on external scaffolding (and thus less heavily 
on her neurons), there is an important sense in which Dana’s 
mind is capable of less than someone who could perform the 
same task relying exclusively on neural machinery. If all that 
really counts as the mind is the neural underpinnings, 
someone with non-diminished neural systems is more 
cognitively capable than someone with diminished neural 
systems. On the other hand, if there is not the same 
equivalence between neural activity and mental activity, and 
mental activity is determined by heterogenous physical 
underpinnings, then diminished neural activity does not 
entail diminished mental activity. The conclusion that less 
neural activity equals less cognition is no longer necessary, 
and thus compensatory strategies of cognitive rehabilitation 
are perfectly legitimate ways of restoring a damaged mind. 
 
6.   IMPROVING THE MIND 
 
I have argued that the embedded mind thesis is committed to 
an identity between mental activity and neural activity. If 
that’s the case, then an LD individual who relies on assistive 
technology to complete cognitive tasks is only “doing” as 
much as her neurons are doing. That is, if her cognition is 
exclusively located in his neurons, then within a given task, 
whatever work is being done by the bio-external tools is not 
done by her. The more heavily integrated the assistive 
technology into a cognitive process, the less cognition the 
person is performing. Thus, if the embedded thesis is right, 
it commits us to saying that LD individuals who rely heavily 
on assistive technologies are cognitively capable of less than 
non-LD individuals.  
 
But this seems wrong. Assistive technologies are tools that 
help LD individuals do more, not less. When Dana uses her 
graphic organizer to aid in strategic planning or decision 
making, it seems that the tools make her capable of more 
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than she was able to do without them. Indeed, this is 
precisely how many LD individuals understand their 
relationship to assistive technologies. LD individuals who 
have consistent access to assistive technologies in the 
classroom report feeling less anxious, more independent, 
and more confident in their own abilities (Day and Edwards 
1996). Rather than making them feel as if the more they use 
technologies, the less they can do “themselves” (the picture 
of cognitive capability that the embedded thesis predicts), 
well-assisted LD individuals report feeling as if they are 
capable of doing more, and with an increased sense of 
independence and self-reliance. Testimonial reports of the 
impact of access to assistive technology on LD individuals’ 
self-concept further supports the suggestion that LD 
individuals see themselves in this way. In one study, students 
reported that the ability to learn using these technologies 
increased their confidence in their own intelligence, their 
ability to do as much as their non-LD classmates are able to 
do, and their motivation (Young and Specht 2011). In fact, 
some students describe the impact of these technologies in a 
way that even more explicitly indicates that they see their 
relationship to them in the way I have suggested. One 
student explained, “I have a better view of myself. My self-
confidence goes up, my self esteem goes up, and I’m not 
always like ‘Man, I failed this. I’m such an idiot.’” (Young 
and Specht 2011) Another student asserted, “I have more 
confidence in my schoolwork. I feel that I am capable of 
completing it.” (Young and Specht 2010, 2011). The 
language that many students use to describe the impact of 
assistive technologies directly indicates that it is their 
capabilities that have been improved through use of the 
technology. Still other testimonies indicate that students 
view themselves as increasingly self-reliant, and the 
technologies allow them to “help themselves”; as one 
student explained, “I have less need to rely on others to 
complete the task, so I don’t ask for them to help me as 
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much.” Another said, “I feel more independent. I can do 
things by myself, whereas before I couldn’t.” (Young and 
Specht 2010, 2011). These testimonies all indicate that many 
LD individuals who have access to assistive technologies 
view themselves as being more cognitively capable with the 
technologiesii.  
 
Day and Edwards (1996) discuss this kind of improved 
capability in the context of LD individuals who use word 
processing or spell-check technology in writing, tools that 
enable them to write unencumbered by difficulties with the 
“mechanics” of writing:  
 
When not preoccupied with the mechanical 
aspects of writing, persons with LD have a 
greater opportunity to focus on making 
meaning. This is of particular importance for 
those individuals who have developed a fear 
of translating their thoughts into written 
language as the result of a history of writing 
problems and the criticism that often follows. 
Knowing that they can simply generate 
language and correct errors later may reduce 
their anxiety, liberate their writing abilities, 
and ultimately facilitate written expression at 
a level commensurate with their intelligence. 
(30) 
 
In this case, the assistive technology does not simply do 
extra work for the individual that can be neatly separated 
from her own capabilities. On the contrary, the technology 
simply provides support for the individual so that she, 
properly coupled with this support, can develop her own 
capacities. In fact, the technological support seems to 
liberate the individual’s capacities by removing an 
impediment to their development and expression. This belief 
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that assistive technologies help LD individuals do more 
rather than less is one that the extended mind position can 
better account for than the embedded mind framework. If the 
cognitive capabilities of the LD individual are limited only 
to what her neurons can do, then any increased capabilities 
that result from the use of assistive technologies must be 
attributed to the technology itself rather than the individual. 
On the other hand, if the extended mind hypothesis is 
correct, and therefore cognitive capabilities are attributed to 
extended organism-plus-environment systems, then it is true 
that the assistive technologies help the individual do more 
rather than less.  
 
At this point, the defender of the embedded mind framework 
might object that I have mischaracterized the inability of the 
embedded position to accommodate this belief. It is perfectly 
consistent with their position, one might argue, that assistive 
technologies do, in some sense, help LD individuals do more 
rather than less. That is, even the embedded mind defender 
would likely maintain that Dana’s graphic organizer helps 
her arrive at more carefully and clearly considered decisions 
(rather than detracting from her ability to do so). However, 
the crucial difference between the embedded and extended 
frameworks is in what, precisely, it means under each 
framework to “do more”. It can’t simply mean “achieve 
better outcomes”, since the embedded mind framework is 
consistent with the claim that improving the environmental 
tools available to a cognizing individual helps her achieve 
better outcomes. The relevant difference between the two 
positions is this: the embedded framework must assert that 
assistive technologies enable Dana to achieve more qua 
competent tool user, where the individual and the tool she is 
using are neatly separable. The extended mind framework, 
on the other hand, can assert that the assistive technology 
allows Dana herself, qua cognizer, to do more. In the latter 
case, there is no such clear distinction between the individual 
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and the tool she is using to complete the task, and thus the 
increase in ability cannot solely be attributed to the tool 
itself.  
 
An analogy will help clarify this distinction. Consider a 
professional baker, Frank, whose job it is to make large 
quantities of bread. He must knead each batch of dough by 
hand, which takes a great deal of time and energy. Frank is 
then given a handheld dough scraper, a tool that makes it 
easier to pick up, turn, and portion the dough when kneading 
it. This tool allows Frank to knead greater quantities of 
dough in a given amount of time, and so in some sense, 
enables Frank to do more than he could do by hand. But the 
tool hasn’t enhanced Frank’s abilities in any deep sense that 
we could attribute to Frank himself; Frank isn’t a better 
baker himself, given his access to the tool. With the tool, 
Frank can do precisely the same things that he could do 
without the tool, only much more efficiently. His skills and 
capabilities qua baker are the same as they were before, but 
he is able to achieve better outcomes than he was without the 
tool.  
 
Now consider a runner, Frances, who usually runs barefoot. 
Because she runs without shoes, her feet and legs tend to get 
fatigued after a few miles. She is then given a pair of high-
quality running shoes with padded arch support and grip 
soles. Because of the design of these shoes, Frances can run 
more efficiently and with less fatigue than before, allowing 
her to run longer and faster. With these shoes, Frances is able 
to run on new and different sorts of terrain, spend more time 
training, increase her endurance, and run more frequently. It 
seems in this case that, although the shoes are in some sense 
a “tool” for running, they enable Frances to improve her 
capabilities as a runner. She isn’t using the shoes as a tool 
to run in the same way that Frank uses the dough scraper as 
a tool for kneading dough; she, in her shoes, is simply 
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running, and running better than she could without them. 
The shoes allow her to enhance her capabilities qua runner.  
 
It seems that the proponent of the embedded mind view can 
accommodate the belief that assistive technologies help LD 
individuals do more rather than less, but only in the sense 
that someone like Frank can, using a tool, achieve better 
outcomes than he could without the tool. If cognition is 
located exclusively in neurons, then a bio-external tool does, 
in some sense, help an LD individual produce a particular 
result better than she could without it. But we want to say 
more than that about how assistive technologies help LD 
individuals; we want to account for their belief that assistive 
technologies help LD individuals think better. The extended 
mind framework, which conceptualizes the coupled system 
of an LD individual and her assistive technology as a single 
and unified cognitive system (in the same way that Frances 
and her running shoes are a single and unified running 
system), better captures this belief that her cognitive 
capacities are improved than does the embedded mind 
framework, which maintains a clearer separation between 
the capabilities of the individual and the work being done by 
the tool.  
 
The embedded mind framework can account for the fact that 
assistive technologies do, in some sense, help LD individuals 
“do more” than they could without them by characterizing 
them as cases of tool use. But as long as the defender of the 
embedded mind position is committed to the intracranialist 
definition of cognition that underlies it, according to which 
cognition can only be realized by neurons, there must remain 
a clear delineation between the mental activity of the 
individual and the non-mental contributions of the 
technology. It cannot account for the fact that, for instance, 
LD individuals’ belief that word processors and spell 
checkers help them think and communicate better. On the 
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embedded view, the more that the underlying computation 
of generating language is distributed across neural and non-
neural mechanisms in LD individuals, the less capable the 
LD individual is qua cognizer of generating language. The 
extended mind framework, on the other hand, has no trouble 
accounting for LD individuals’ belief that word processors 
help them think better rather than simply produce better 
results. Cognition itself is distributed across the extended 
system of the brain, body, and technology, and so the mental 
capabilities of the individual are improved through the 
coupling of the neural resources with non-neural resources.  
 
One way the embedded mind defender might respond is by 
conceding that it is correct to say that an LD individual using 
an assistive technology is doing less than a non-LD 
individual, but only in a restricted sense. That is, it might be 
right to say that an LD individual using a spell checker or 
word processor is thinking less, but she is only thinking less 
about spelling. However, that doesn’t mean she is thinking 
less overall. In fact, the way I have characterized this case 
seems to suggest just that; by reducing the amount of mental 
energy the individual needs to use on thinking about 
spelling, the assistive technology frees up that mental energy 
for simply “making meaning”. Thus, the embedded mind 
defender might simply deny that the reduction in cognitive 
activity with respect to one narrow feature of a task (like 
spelling in the task of writing) entails an overall reduction in 
cognitive processing or capability with respect to that task.  
 
This objection might be apt in the case of a spell checker, 
where the feature of the task that the assistive technology is 
meant to address (spelling) is relatively neatly separable 
from the central task (communicating ideas). Furthermore, 
spelling is a rather minor mechanical feature of writing, and 
so it’s easy to argue that alleviating the work required for 
this minor mechanical feature does not really detract from 
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the overall cognitive activity involved in the task of writing. 
However, this distinction becomes less clear in the original 
case I presented of Dana and the graphic organizer. Recall 
that the purpose of graphic organizers is to make salient the 
relationships among concepts and aid LD individuals in 
understanding and evaluating those relationships. These 
assistive technologies help LD individuals in problem 
solving, critical analysis, and decision making. In this case, 
it is much more difficult to separate the “work” done by the 
assistive technology from the central cognitive task. The 
relationships among concepts are central to tasks like 
problem solving and decision making, and helping LD 
individuals understand those relationships amounts to more 
than simply alleviating a minor mechanical burden. In this 
case, the function of the assistive technology is integral to 
the overall cognitive task. Therefore, one cannot point to the 
work being done by the assistive technology and say that the 
LD individual is doing less thinking about that but not 
thinking less about the overall task, as one can in the spell 
checker case.  
 
One cannot argue that, with a graphic organizer, Dana is 
doing less cognitive work but only with respect to 
understanding the relationships among ideas and not with 
respect to the task of problem solving or decision making; 
the two are inextricably tied up. Because this distinction 
cannot be easily made in the case of Dana and the graphic 
organizer, I maintain that the embedded mind defender must 
be committed to saying that Dana’s reliance on such 
technology entails diminished cognitive capabilities with 
respect to tasks like decision making and problem solving.  
 
The difference between the graphic organizer case and the 
spell check case does, however, illuminate a challenge for 
the future of this debate. Since there are a wide variety of 
kinds of learning disabilities and therefore of kinds of 
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assistive technologies, what the embedded and extended 
mind positions are committed to saying in each case might 
also vary. Because of this, the relative compatibility of each 
position with how LD individuals conceptualize their 
relationship to the assistive technology might be different, 
and thus the embedded mind framework might be able to 
capture some cases better than others. However, I argue that 
in many cases it fails to do so, and thus the extended mind 
framework merits serious attention in its ability to capture 
such cases.  
 
7.   CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that the embedded mind thesis is committed to 
an identity between neural activity and mental activity, and 
thus entails that LD individuals who rely heavily on external 
scaffolding to complete cognitive tasks must have 
diminished cognitive capabilities compared to non-LD 
individuals. Furthermore, I have argued that, according to 
the embedded mind thesis, assistive technologies that 
encourage the integration of bio-external tools into cognitive 
processes function to detract from an LD individual’s 
cognitive capabilities rather than enhance them. I then 
suggested that we have strong reason to reject such 
conclusions based on the limitations those conclusions place 
on the possibility of cognitive rehabilitation and 
improvement, the incompatibility of those conclusions with 
our intuitive understanding of the purpose and function of 
assistive technologies, and the testimonial data we have 
about how LD individuals who use assistive technologies 
understand their own capabilities. The extended mind 
position, however, avoids these conclusions and better 
captures the way we ought to understand LD individuals’ 
cognitive capabilities. Thus, I concluded, we have good 
reason to prefer the extended mind framework to the 
embedded mind one.  
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One might object that our framework for understanding 
cognition need not capture all of our intuitions about how 
our minds work. Indeed, much research in cognitive science 
has illustrated the ways that folk intuitions about the mind 
turn out to be quite false. Thus, one might argue that the 
incompatibility of a theory of the mind with our intuitions 
about our minds is not strong evidence that the theory is 
wrong. However, since I am evaluating the compatibility of 
these two frameworks with what LD individuals believe 
about their own capabilities, and I argue that those beliefs 
ought to have normative weight in our theorizing about the 
mind, this discussion is precisely where such considerations 
ought to have weight. My claim is that if the embedded mind 
thesis lead us to conclusions about the capabilities of LD 
individuals that we have good normative reason to reject, 
then we have reason to discard the embedded thesis in favor 
of the extended thesis. LD individuals’ concept of their own 
capabilities ought to play a significant role in our general 
understanding of their capabilities, and thus a theory of 
cognition that conflicts with that testimony ought to be 
reconsidered.  
 
Learning-disabled individuals and the assistive technologies 
they use bring to light new normative questions regarding 
how we ought to conceptualize the mind. Since the scientific 
study of the mind is still relatively immature, and the domain 
of cognitive science lacks clear boundaries, those who 
engage with traditional metaphysical questions in the debate 
about the extended mind hypothesis can easily find 
themselves in a stalemate of competing intuitions about what 
ought to count as cognition. The examination of the 
normative implications of the embedded and extended mind 
frameworks, particularly for people with atypical cognitive 
makeups, can provide a new way of gaining traction on the 
debate. 
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NOTES
i In this discussion, I will use “mind” and “cognition” interchangeably. 
This may not be appropriate in all contexts, but since the features of the 
mind and the types of mental states that I will be considering in my 
discussion are higher-level cognitive states and processes (language 
production, decision making, mathematical computation, etc.), I will 
not differentiate between the two.  
ii Though there is evidence that points to the fact that LD individuals 
conceptualize their relationship to assistive technologies in this way, it 
is indirect evidence. The claim has not, to my knowledge, been tested 
directly, and thus more research needs to be done to determine the 
extent to which LD individuals conceive of themselves and their 
assistive technologies this way. However, since there is some indirect 
evidence that this is true, for now, I will conditionalize on this claim. 
My argument can be understood to suggest that if it is true that LD 
individuals view their capabilities and relationship to assistive 
technologies in this way, which there is evidence that they do, then the 
extended mind framework better captures this belief. 
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